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Muriel DARMON 
Bourdieu and psychoanalysis: an empirical and textual 
study of a pas-de-deux 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to elucidate some of the similarities between the Bourdieusian 
and a psychoanalytical approach to understand the individual and the social, 
and to describe Bourdieu’s relation to psychoanalysis. The paper begins by 
reflecting upon the way a research on anorexia was received and perceived by 
some psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Such a case study puts into light several 
analogies between Bourdieu’s theoretical position, his epistemological style and 
psychoanalysis. Then, some texts by Bourdieu, especially a discussion with the 
psychoanalyst and sociologist Jacques Maître, are analyzed in order to further 
explore Bourdieu’s position vis-à-vis psychoanalysis and to assess the influence 
of psychoanalysis on his conception of the individual habitus. Finally, the paper 
discusses the possible contradictions arising between these borrowings and the 
principles of Bourdieusian epistemology. The paper thus suggests that the 
Bourdieusian approach is better analyzed as a ‘sociologisation’of 
psychoanalysis rather than as an approach complementing or integrating 
psychoanalysis. 
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Introduction 
It is not an easy task to find explicit references to psychoanalysis in Bourdieu’s 
texts. As noted by commentators who broached this topic (Fourny, 2000 ; 
Steinmetz 2006) Bourdieu’s texts have the specificity of being increasingly 
peppered with psychoanalytical terms — ‘unconscious, misrecognition, 
projection, reality principle, libido, ego splitting, negation, repression, 
phallonarcissism, compromise formation, and anamnesis’ (Steinmetz, 2013 : 
108) — but without much explicit confrontation or discussion with 
psychoanalysis as a disciplin. Apart from more lenghty passages in his later 
books, such as The Weight of the World and Pascalian Meditations, only a few 
quick notations or implied references can be spotted here or there. Even looking 
for answers in settings where Bourdieu was clearly asked about his 
psychoanalytic engagements does not provide the researcher with substantial 
material to elaborate about the connections of his work with the psy-field. 
When Bourdieu participated in 1992 in the renowned workshop organized by 
long-time followers Gérard Mauger and Louis Pinto ‘Lire les sciences sociales’, 
he was asked by Mauger a question about the habitus and the potential 
resemblance between ’socio-analysis’ and psychoanalysis : ‘Do you analyze the 
way socio-analysis can work on the social unconscious the same way Freud 
analyzes the effects of psychoanalysis on the unconscious?’ (Mauger and Pinto, 
1994 : 314). Bourdieu answered without refering to psychoanalysis, but with a 
quick snap at the psychologisation of social problems, using in inverted 
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commas… a psychoanalytic term (‘displacement’): ‘[Socio-analysis] can provide 
people who suffer with some ways of understanding a little better what is 
happening to them, instead of ‘’displacing’’ their problems, for example in the 
psychological direction’ (Mauger and Pinto, 1994 : 318). 
 
Significantly, the one text that among French sociologists interested in these 
matters is usually thought to convey Bourdieu’s position towards 
psychoanalysis, has not been written by Bourdieu himself and is found hidden 
in a book by the recently deceased Jacques Maître, both a sociologist from 
Bourdieu’s school and a psychoanalyst, which exact reference reads : Jacques 
Maître, avec Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Avant-Propos dialogué’, in Jacques Maître, 
L’Autobiographie d’un paranoïaque, Paris, Economica, 1994, p. V-XXII 
 
Such a  — most likely voluntary — ambiguity of position by Bourdieu, calls for 
clarification. This paper aims to elucidate some of the similarities between the 
Bourdieusian and a psychoanalytical approach and to describe Bourdieu’s 
position. Commentators have already discussed Bourdieu’s relation to 
psychoanalysis, but from a theoretical perspective (Steinmetz, 2006, 2013 ; 
Fourny, 2000 ; Muel-Dreyfus, 2003). Instead of proceeding in a purely 
theoretical manner, the paper will begin by an experiment of sort aimed at 
grasping relations ‘in practice’ between Bourdieusian and psychoanalytical 
orientations : I will reflect upon the way my research on anorexia (Author, 
2009), inspired in part by Bourdieu, was received by psychiatrists and 
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psychoanalysts. Such a case study will display (and not merely discuss) the 
affinities between Bourdieu’s sociology and psychoanalysis. Then, I will draw  
from the  discussion Bourdieu had with the psychoanalyst and sociologist 
Jacques Maître to describe Bourdieu’s position, and assess the influence of 
psychoanalysis on his conception of the individual habitus. Finally, the paper 
will discuss the possible contradictions arising between these borrowings and 
the principles of Bourdieusian epistemology, especially its definition of a 
sociological right to scientific imperialism and its repeated claims about the 
‘social’ nature of the conscious and the subconscious at the individual level. The 
paper suggests that the Bourdieusian approach is better analyzed as a 
‘sociologisation’ of psychoanalysis rather than as an approach  subordinated to, 
complementing or integrating psychoanalysis. 
 
1. Presenting a Bourdieusian research to 
psychoanalysts: experiencing ‘hooked atoms’ 
 
Before I offer a clarification of the terms of engagement of Bourdieusian 
thinking  about psychoanalysis through a reading of Bourdieu’s texts, I 
introduce my argument empirically by focusing on the ways in which a 
sociological study I conducted was received and perceived by a group of 
psychoanalysts to whom I presented it. Such a tiny and, except for me, 
unimportant experience is indeed a way to put into light the ‘hooked atoms of 
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the field’i between Bourdieu’s theoretical position, his epistemological style and 
psychoanalysis. 
 
The study I wish to present briefly here (since it is not the primary focus of the 
article, but an illustration of the arguments that follows) is a qualitative research 
on anorexia. The idea was to propose a consistently sociological way of looking 
at what is most commonly seen as a ‘psychological’ and ‘pathological’ state. As 
a sociologist, I wanted to study anorexia empirically, through fieldwork. I did 
not want to limit my scope to the various contexts of anorexia (historical or 
social), but rather to try and show what a sociological eye could bring to the 
study of anorexia itself, or anorexia ‘in practice’. 
 
In her groundbreaking book on the social history of anorexia, Joan Jacobs 
Brumberg distinguishes between the questions that can be raised and answered 
by social scientists (such as the history of the diagnosis, the sociocultural 
context of the pathology, the analysis of its specific recruitment) and those 
which could not, namely ‘the subsequent “career” as an anorexic [which is] 
obviously the concern of medicine and mental health professionals’ (1988: 38-
40). My study fails to comply with such division of labour between disciplines. 
It focuses on anorexic day-to-day practices and representations, on what 
happens during anorexia, on what anorexics actually do, and not on what they 
represent or symbolize.  
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 Such an approach of ‘anorexia in practice’ is all the more necessary, given that 
the vast majority of social sciences or gender studies of anorexia is concerned 
with the various discourses on anorexia (be that the medical, the popular, or the 
anorexics’ discourses) or with what anorexia ‘symbolizes’ or ‘means’ (Bordo, 
1993; Turner, 1996), and thus take little interest in the anorexic activity itself, 
with sometimes no other data than secondhand material. Another way of 
putting it would be to say that, instead of jumping to posit an anorexic 
subjectivity or an anorexic ontology, even a socially constructed one, I first want 
to study sociologically ‘what anorexia is’ through what anorexics do. This is 
why I use the notion of (deviant) ‘career’ to ‘turn people into activity’ (Becker, 
1998), and to shift from a definition of ‘identity’ to one of action: one is not born 
an anorexic, one must become one, and to ‘be’ (labelled) anorexic, one has to 
‘do’ certain things.  
I do not, however, stop at the sequencing of the anorexic career, and I try to 
extend the analysis. To ‘do’ those things, you have to ‘be’ someone specific: 
what do the people who are doing those things ‘have to be’ to do what they’re 
doing? In the traditional interactionist use of the notion of career, the social 
proprieties of the individual are neglected (or even refused) as explanatory, i.e. 
as reasons to enter a deviant career. As far as anorexia is concerned, this seems 
rather problematic, since the recruitment of the pathology is both specific and 
enduring: the vast majority of anorexic patients are adolescent girls from upper-
middle to upper classes (McClelland and Crisp, 2001), as happened also in my 
own study where I defined class membership based on both parents’ and 
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grandparents’ occupations and diplomas (Author, 2009) (Bourdieu, 1979). In 
my perspective, these social properties are indeed taken into account, but in a 
second step, and as social conditions of possibilities of the anorexic career. The 
interviewees’ habituses, which I study, is both what makes the anorexic career 
possible and what is modified along the various phases of the career, as a result 
of a specific work of self-transformation performed by the anorexics.  
 
This is why my study of anorexia is structured in two different and successive 
moments, and combines an approach of the anorexic career with a study of the 
anorexic habitus (Author, 2009). What is important for my demonstration here, 
is the fact that the book this study gave birth to, published in 2003, is clearly 
divided into two parts, related to the ‘career’, as in the interactionist approach, 
and to the habitus in social space, as in the Bourdieusian approach.  
 
The first part offers a reconstruction of the anorexic career, based on an 
interactionist approach of deviance, and describes the anorexic activity as a self-
conversion work. The second part of my work (and of the book) on anorexia is 
the analysis of the anorexic habitus and its social space. The set of practices that 
constitutes the anorexic career are located in a specific place within the social 
space. For example, what the interviewees eat and what they don’t eat is not 
chosen randomly, or only according to the calorie intake of each food. Food 
selections reveal ‘dominant tastes’ (Bourdieu, 1979) for they single out foods 
that are consumed in greater amounts by upper classes still today in France 
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(fruits and vegetables, fish and seafood, yoghurts…). Anorexia is therefore not 
only about ‘restricting’ food: it is about choosing a certain type of food, with 
certain properties, both caloric and social. And this is done at the expense of 
other foods, which are strongly associated with working-class tastes, such as 
bread, charcuterie, or plats en sauces. Anorexia is therefore an extreme but 
relevant case in point to show the enduring social class distinctions of eating 
practices, tastes and distastes (Wills et al., 2011; Rhys-Taylor, 2013). More 
generally, anorexic food practices, body practices and school practices, however 
weird or pathological they may appear, echo those of the upper and middle 
classes from which comes the majority of anorexic patients. They therefore 
reveal the construction, at the result of the conversion work of the anorexic 
career, of an anorexic habitus which can be located within the social space of 
social classes. 
 
This summary of my results aims at showing that the interactionist deviant 
career orientation and the Bourdieusian one are, to a large extent, separated in 
the book, and this is also how I am used to present my arguments: in two 
distinct ‘moments’. 
 
Another duality must be mentioned, regarding the settings of the research. It 
was conducted in France and based on repeated in-depth interviews with 14 
anorexic patients from different hospitals and five months of observations of 
the everyday life and talk therapy sessions in the units they were hospitalized 
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in, together with interviews with some of their teachers (11 interviews), 
snowball interviews of formerly diagnosed anorexics (three) and comparative 
interviews on body and food practices with high-school girls (11 interviews). 
The persons interviewed as anorexic patients were all adolescent girls, and 
were all from upper and middle classes (Author, 2009). More precisely, the 
research was conducted in two different hospitals, representative of two 
antagonistic ‘approaches’ to anorexic treatment (Luhrmann, 2000) within 
psychiatry. The first hospital was of a biomedical orientation : in spite of the 
differences or even conflicts between the members of the medical teams, they 
believed in a multifaceted explanation of anorexia where biological factors were 
prominent, had no difficulties in using profusely the official diagnostics and 
diagnoses manuals, and were used to prescribe drug therapy (combined with a 
behavioural and cognitive approach) at the core of the treatment. The second 
hospital was, conversely, of a psychodynamic and psychoanalytical orientation: 
the teams looked for causes of anorexia in the patients’ past, family past and 
family dynamics, medics were reluctant to use official diagnostics 
classifications, interpreted the biological and practical manifestations of 
anorexia as mere symptoms, and used talk therapy as the  main and most 
recognized course of treatment. Over the years, I presented my study in both 
institutions, as well as in a dozen of other medical settings, broadly belonging 
to one or the other of the two therapeutic orientations. It is from these 
presentations of two different kinds of sociology to two different kinds of 
psychology, that I draw the ‘impressions’ and the data — or ‘quasi-data’, since I 
 11 
cannot claim to have performed a real sociological study of reception — that I 
use here. 
 
To put it in a nutshell, each part of my research — which I labelled according to 
their main sociological allegiance as the ‘anorexic deviant career’ or the 
‘anorexic habitus’— resonated strongly with, respectively, the 
biological/biomedical, or the psychodynamic/psychoanalytic therapeutic 
orientations. 
 
I shall focus in this paper on the case of the psychoanalysts’ responses to the 
Bourdieusian analysis, linking the ‘anorexic habitus’ part of my research and 
the psychoanalytic orientation, because this is a productive means to engage  
the discussion I wish to develop about Bourdieu’s relationship with 
psychoanalysis. Therefore I will only mention here that the biomedically 
oriented psychiatrists had many reasons to feel closer to the deviant-career part 
of my work, which they favoured and spontaneously understood, and to 
partake in its criticisms of functionalism but also psychoanalysis (Becker, 1964). 
On the other hand, psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically-minded 
psychiatrists clearly favoured the arguments, results and findings of the 
Bourdieusian part of my book – the anorexic habitus -, both because of what the 
approach was up against and because of what it stood for, as I will show now. 
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Psychoanalysts approved my choice of drawing from a Bourdieusian 
approach in my  study of anorexia, first because it meant critizising a 
‘descriptive‘ approach of the anorexic career and studying the individual 
predispositions that make the progression into such a career possible. The 
description of the anorexic career in the first part of my book was inspired by a 
Beckerian definition of a deviant career (Becker, 1963, 1998): the reasons or 
causes to enter the career are not to be taken into consideration, the question 
being ‘how‘ people engage in a particular activity and not ’why’ they do it. 
Whenever I presented results from my study and the reasons to go from Part I 
(the anorexic career) to Part II (the anorexic habitus), I argued that the career 
approach was missing the fact that ‘not everybody’ had the same probability to 
enter into an anorexic career or stay on its path, and that the anorexic activity 
actually presupposes some class predispositions that can account for the 
specifity of the upper-class recruitment of the pathology (Author, 2009). 
 
This actually loosely resembled how psychoanalysts criticize behavioural 
psychology and biological approaches, as only focused on a ‘symptom’, and as 
lacking historical depth in the study of the individual. Psychoanalytical 
audiences also approved of the epistemological shift entailed by moving from 
Becker to Bourdieu, because they perceived it as switching from description to 
explanation, from the given to the hidden, from a pragmatically-viewed present 
(what people are doing) to a deterministic and enduring past (what people are, 
or have to be, to do what they do). As I argued that social conditions of 
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possibilities were necessary to enter the anorexic career, and that statistics 
showed that two-thirds of the patients come from the upper classes, they heard 
that ‘studying the symptom ‘ without taking into account the psychic 
construction of the individual during childhood and adolescence leads to only a 
partial apprehension of the anorexia phenomena. 
 
In a more positive manner, the psychoanalytic audiences often exhibited 
interest in the core Bourdieusian idea of the influence of primary socialization, 
of the persistent making of the individual within the first years of his or her 
existence. The Bourdieusian approach evidently shares with psychoanalysis a 
principle summarized in a sentence by Durkheim often quoted by Bourdieu 
(1980: 94) :  
Within us lies in various proportions Yesterday’s man. And it is even him 
who is predominant in us, since present is but a very small thing 
compared to this long past where we were formed and from which we 
result (…) Yesterday’s man is the unconscious part of ourselves. 
(Durkheim, 1938: 18-19) 
 
As Francine Muel-Dreyfus (2003 : 228) puts it, Bourdieusan sociology, as 
psychoanalysis, ‘gives a great deal of room for the uncouscious’ and ‘must fight 
against the amnesia of genesis which eternalizes and reifies concepts and 
categories, thus naturalizing the social’. This is why my quest for ‘Yesterday’s 
woman’ within anorexic patients and my various invocations of the social past 
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of patients as explaining their conduct — be that the individual past of the 
socio-genesis of a given habitus, or the collective past of history — always 
resonated strongly with the psychoanalytical audience. It was the case 
whenever I threw light upon today’s anorexia with a reference to the 
construction of the modern ‘universe of class bodies’ (the social hierarchy of 
bodily shapes and styles)  (Bourdieu, 1979) at the end of nineteenth century, 
when thinness and emaciation went from stigma of poverty to status symbols 
and attributes of the ‘leisure classes’ (Author, 2003). It was also the case 
whenever I took into account the individual past of the socio-genesis of a given 
habitus. The anorexic patients I interviewed displayed social dispositions that 
could be related to their middle- and upper-class upbringings. Manifestations 
and proofs of the weight of the social past of their class socialization on their 
present behaviour were always welcome by the psychoanalytic audiences, both 
as familiar and as complementary with their own point of view. This was for 
example what happened whenever I presented my analyses of the anorexic 
ethos of ‘control’ over corporeal destiny — the body can and will be 
transformed — and showed it was characteristic of middle and upper classes 
and in contrast with a more fatalist body acceptance in the working classes. 
Similarly, the interviews displayed a more general ethos of control over social 
destiny which appears also to be connected with a specific class socialization 
(Author, 2003, 2009). The fact that I did not resort to the usual psychological 
explanation of the ‘urge for control’ (supposedly typical of anorexics) did not 
prevent psychoanalysts to feel familiar and attuned to the idea of explaining 
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such a behaviour within a family past, even if the strong point of my 
explanation related to a social class past.  
 
To summarize what I want to draw from this account of the presentations of my 
research to psychoanalytic inclined audiences: my argument is that these 
manifest preferences both for what a Bourdieusian approach criticized (the 
epistemological choice of ‘description’ and the obliteration of the past) and 
provided (causal explanations of behaviours and attention to individual and 
group history) are not a coincidence, but proceed from the ‘elective affinities’ 
between the Bourdieusian and the psychoanalytical approach, and their 
respective positions within the fields of sociology and psy-fields or particular 
branches of medicine. Between the two main sociological orientations I 
presented – the interactionist deviant career and the anorexic habitus -, the 
psychoanalytic audience ‘chose’ the one that most resembled its own (Bourdieu 
was embraced as a sociologist they could ‘think with’) and the one that was 
opposed to a kind of sociology – the interactionist - that resembled a psychiatric 
position they were up against (Bourdieu was also embraced as a sociologist 
they could ‘criticize with’). 
 
2. A ‘pas de deux’ between sociology and psychoanalysis 
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Once experienced and delineated, the proximity I found between Bourdieu and 
psychoanalysis can appear quite self-evident. This makes all the more 
surprising the very small number of explicit references to psychoanalysis made 
by Bourdieu in his books over the years, with the exception of some more 
explicit engagements in his later writings — The Weight of the World and 
Pascalian Meditations. 
 
In The Weight of the World, published in French in 1993, the word 
‘Psychoanalysis’ appears twice in the Index — which is rare, the word seldom 
appears in Bourdieu’s other indexes.ii Psychoanalysis is mainly discussed in the 
last two pages of ‘The Contradictions of Inheritance’, a text written by 
Bourdieu, where Freud is quoted once. But we note that this discussion begins 
with a very striking statement: ‘This is not the place to question the relation 
between the mode of exploring subjectivity proposed here and that practiced by 
psychoanalysis’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 512). 
 
In Pascalian Meditations, published in French in 1997, ‘psychoanalysis’ does not 
figure in the Index rerum (Freud is referenced four times in the Index nominum, 
though), but ‘psychological operations’, described in explicit psychoanalytic 
terms (projection, identification, transference, sublimation, etc.) are discussed 
more extensively in the book and especially in the first pages of Chapter 5, 
called ‘Libido and illusio’ (Bourdieu, 1997: 197-201). 
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I will return to the content of these texts, but let me just note now that, all in all, 
the explicit discussions of psychoanalysis by Bourdieu do not amount to much 
given the ‘obvious’ proximity referred to above and compared, for example, to 
the way Bourdieu deals with history, or with economics, in his books. Among 
French sociologists interested in the connections between sociology and psy-
fields, the advice given to academics looking for more has always been to read a 
text, not written by Bourdieu himself, but which is supposed to convey ‘his’ 
position on the subject of psychoanalysis. This text is the preliminary section 
(called an ‘Avant-propos dialogué’, ‘Foreword in the form of a dialogue’) of 
L’Autobiographie d’un paranoïaque by Jacques Maître, published in 1994. 
 
Since this book is not translated into English, let me present in some details the 
content of its preamble. It is indeed cast as a dialogue between Bourdieu and 
Maître, of which I will discuss three important themes : the question of the 
dialectics between instincts and institutions, the difference between ‘institution’ 
and ‘field’, and the affinity with psychoanalysis as an acquired right for 
Bourdieu’s sociology following years of what he calls ‘repression’. 
 
The dialectics between instincts and institutions 
 
Bourdieu begins by praising Maître for having chosen to conduct a methodical  
and scientific enquiry on subjects usually tackled in essays, such as the 
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relationship between sociology and psychoanalysis, and more specifically, the 
question of the cathexis (investissement) in institutions — Maître had mainly 
studied the religious institution and Christian mysticism. According to 
Bourdieu, the various cases studied by Maitre (such as Sainte Thérèse de 
Lisieux, or Madeleine Lebouc, a patient of the nineteenth century psychologist 
Pierre Janet) make it possible to see ‘how dispositions (as potentialities) are 
actually related to certain institutions, or, better, certain fields (as array of 
possibilities); how social agents exploit institutions to satisfy their instincts 
(pulsions) (…), and how institutions, conversely, make the social agents’ 
instincts serve their own ends’ (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: VI).iii Later in the 
text, Bourdieu elaborates on the ‘general dialectics’ between the individual (ie, 
in this text, his or her dispositions, instincts, personal history) and the 
institution: ‘the investment in the institution and the investment by the 
institution, coercion and adhesion, etc.’ (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: IX). Social 
agents, ‘depending on their personal history and therefore their dispositions’, 
select some of the meanings offered by the institution. The institution itself 
offers a ‘space of pre-processed possibilities. It regulates dispositions: it 
constraints and censors them at the same time that it  opens routes to them’ 
(Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: VI). 
 
Maitre agrees with Bourdieu’s theoretical proposition that a dialectics exists 
between individual and institutions, and links his own work to Bourdieu’s 
sociology:  
 19 
In The Rules of Art, you said the field was providing social agents with a 
legitimate form to fulfill their wishes (désirs), and the phrase got me 
thinking. When one speaks of ‘wish’ (désir), one can be on 
psychoanalytical grounds, but from the moment one speaks of 
legitimacy, of field, one is on the sociological side. Knowing how this 
negociation between wishes and legitimacy works for each person is the 
crux of the matter. (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: VII) 
 
They then discuss some of the cases studied by Maître, as instances of 
relationships between instincts and institutions, and Bourdieu concludes again 
by remarking on the dialectical relation between the two. People, who have 
specific ‘interests’, ‘instincts’ and ‘wishes linked with their family history’, 
‘choose’ some institutions because these institutions can provide them with 
ways of expressing or satisfying these instincts; but conversely, institutions 
‘choose’ people, redirect and manage their instincts:  
In the process through which somebody becomes a professor, for 
example, [the negociation between the instincts and the institutions] is a 
very long one; it begins in middle school: the pupil who seats in the first 
row, who raises his hand to speak, chooses the institution and is chosen 
by the institution because he chooses it. One can’t tell which chooses 
which, if the institution chooses the individual or if it is the other way 
round. (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: VIII-IX) 
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This two-way street between wishes and institutions is finally defined by 
Bourdieu as the specific objet of a new discipline: ‘socioanalysis’. 
A socioanalysis which would truly go beyond the opposition between 
psychoanalysis and sociology should focus both on the way institutions 
work on wishes and on the way wishes work on  institutions. (Maître 
and Bourdieu, 1994: XIX) 
 
‘Institutions or, better, fields…’  
 
As far as this central theme of the dialogue is concerned, the discussion between 
Maître and Bourdieu (and implicitly between psychoanalysis and sociology) 
often uses correspondences. For example, they speak indifferently of ‘social 
agents’, ‘individuals’ or ‘persons’ (sujets), and of ‘dispositions’, ‘instincts’ or 
‘wishes’, as if there were no distinction about the epistemological connotations 
of these terms. From the beginning, however, Bourdieu seems more cautious 
about one such correspondence, nevertheless often used in the text both by him 
and Maître: the one holding between the Bourdieusian notion of ‘field’ and the 
psychoanalytical use of the term ‘institution’. At its first occurrence, Bourdieu 
speaks of ‘the institution or, better, the field’, and he elaborates on this more 
appropriate notion of field later in the discussion: ‘One must not forget the 
elasticity of the institution; that’s why I prefer to say ‘’field’’, because there is 
always a space of possibles’ (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: X). Maître 
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acknowledges that Bourdieu is ‘right to criticize [his] excessive use of the term 
‘’institution’’ because it gives the wrong idea of monolitism’ (Maître and 
Bourdieu, 1994: XII). Bourdieu concludes this line of discussion by reaffirming 
the superior value of the ‘field’:  
The notion of ‘’field’’ is useful in that it makes it possible to say that there 
is unity, within a field, ‘’in’’ and ‘’through’’ conflict. What unites people 
in a given field is conflict. They agree to disagree over the monopoly of 
something, and they are therefore bound by what divides them (…) The 
fields’ elasticity is huge, and I think fields end up being much more 
pervert than apparatuses (les champs sont beaucoup plus pervers que les 
appareils), because they allow so much more. (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: 
XII)  
As it is clear in this last sentence, the criticism of the psychoanalytical use of the 
term ‘institution’ has nonetheless a conciliatory connection with the 
psychoanalytical characterization of the field as ‘pervert’. This move, ‘two steps 
forward, one step back’, is, as we will see, a recurrent move used by Bourdieu 
to temper his objections against psychoanalysis, as soon as he utters them — 
once again a rare courtesy, which Bourdieu never extended to economics, for 
example —: the dialogue with Maître is indeed a pas-de-deuxiv. 
 
The ‘guts to transgress’  
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This ‘affinity’ approach, made of conciliation and correspondences between 
sociological and psychoanalytical terms, is given a new meaning later in the 
discussion. Bourdieu claims that such an affinity is an acquired right for him, 
because he had to overcome the ‘collective positivist repression’, dating back to 
the nineteenth century, which forbade him, as a sociologist, to acknowledge this 
proximity :  
[In Janet’s time], there was this collective repression, with a prevailing 
scientism. When I read again the Durkheimians — God knows they are 
still overwhelming, and we wish we would live up to them — it seems to 
me there is one thing for which we have made huge progress compared 
to them, and it is in reflexivity (…) The same goes with Marx, who was 
very good at ‘psychoanalyzing’ others, but not very reflexive (…). Saying 
[in The Weight of the World] that an interview was a spiritual exercize was 
hard. I have always thought that, I have always felt it. But there was this 
kind of positivist repression (refoulement positiviste): a questionnaire must 
be scientific (rigoureux), objective, neutral, there’s no cathexis 
(investissement)… You must also have known this form of masochism, 
which passes for professional virtue. I had to wait to be the age I am 
now, and to have the social guts (culot social) that come with it, to be able 
to transgress like that. (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: XIV-XVIII) 
By refering to his current ‘social guts’, Bourdieu states that his consecrated 
position in the field of sociology in 1994 had allowed him to break with old 
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habits, both individual and collective, regarding what was deemed scientifically 
proper in a field inherited from nineteenth century French sociology. 
 
3. A thirty years relationship, from repression to 
transgression ? 
The implicit history contained in Bourdieu’s last quotation could be understood 
more precisely as follows: from an adhesion to — or an impossibility to 
explicitly defect from— a positivist repression, Bourdieu would have been 
increasingly able, through reflexive work in particular, but also self-confidence, 
to embrace his inner affinity with psychoanalysis and to call for a 
‘socioanalysis’ as a way to ‘trully go beyond the opposition between 
psychoanalysis and sociology’. 
 
From an imperialist sociology to a call for unity ? 
 
Apart from Bourdieu’s reluctance to assimilate ‘fields’ with ‘institutions’, and 
also  a short passage to which I will return, the ‘Avant Propos dialogué’ could be 
read as bearing witness to the process of bridging the oppposition between 
sociology and psychoanalysis, and as constituting a decisive shift from 
Bourdieu’s original epistemological stance on this matter. 
 24 
 
In Le Métier de sociologue — the building blocks of Bourdieu’s epistemology 
written in collaboration with J.-C. Passeron and J.-C. Chamboredon — a 
Durkheimian stance is adopted and defended:  
Durkheim’s moto [one must explain the social by the social and by the 
social only] recalls the methodological decision not to prematurely give 
up the right to sociological explanation, or rather, not to adopt a 
principle of explanation borrowed from another science, be that biology 
or psychology, as long as the efficiency of purely sociological methods of 
explanation has not been fully tested. (Bourdieu et al., 1968: 35) 
Even if it does not mean that sociology has the ‘intention to explain 
sociologically each and every aspect of human reality’ (Bourdieu et al., 1968: 35), 
such a Durkhemian stance is still very far from a call to go beyond the 
opposition between psychonalysis and sociology. 
 
Moreover, Le Métier de Sociologue states very strongly that sociological concepts 
have their own meaning, and that no ‘correspondence’ between these and 
others from different disciplines (like the ones used in the dialogue with Maître) 
is to be made. For example, Bourdieu suggests as ‘a good method’ never to 
speak of ‘the unconscious’ of social agents, but rather of what they do ‘without 
knowing it’, ‘without being aware of it’, ‘unconsciously’, etc. ‘The unconscious’ 
is in the text clearly referred to as psychoanalysis, as ‘another tradition’, which 
uses it ‘with another meaning’, not a sociological one. In Le Métier de sociologue, 
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both Durkheim (who stated the difference between the ‘unconscious’ as a 
particular psychic agency and the existence of patterns of behaviour people are 
not conscious of) and Wittgenstein (who insisted on the difference between 
saying ‘I have a toothache without knowing it’ and ‘I have an unconscious 
toothache’) are summoned to suggest and to explain the difference — the 
opposition — between sociology and psychoanalysis as far as this is concerned. 
There is no analogy here between psychoanalytical and sociological terms, but a 
clear distinction is made between ‘the unconscious as a specific psychic agency’, 
as assumed by psychoanalysis, and ‘the existence of patterns of conduct that 
people are not aware of’ studied by sociology (Bourdieu et al, 1968: 152-153). 
Finally, even when Bourdieu quotes an idea by Bachelard of a ‘psychoanalysis 
of the scientific mind’, it is not without an immediate affirmation of the need ‘to 
expand’ it through the sociology of knowledge and an analysis of the social 
conditions in which sociological research is conducted (Bourdieu et al, 1968: 14), 
thus stating clearly sociology’s prominence and independence. 
 
Thirty years later in the discussion with Maître, the general tone found in 
Bourdieu’s works is very different. It is also different in the two of his major 
texts that we have singled out earlier, The Weight of the World and Pascalian 
Meditations, where he appears to be dealing more explicitly with 
psychoanalysis. 
 
 26 
First, The Weight of the World manifests a different way of relating with 
‘interviewees’ and a different relationships between the interviewees’ discourse 
and the scientific discourse of objectification — this is apparent in the 
discussion with Maître, where Bourdieu speaks of this book as a transgression 
regarding the ‘positivist repression’. More particularly, one of the short texts 
written by Bourdieu within it, ‘The contradictions of the inheritance’ (Bourdieu, 
1999: 507-513), makes many references, implicit or explicit, to psychoanalysis, 
for example when referring to ‘transgression’ , ‘reality principle’, ‘identification’ 
(‘The son’s identification to the father’s wish to be continued…’ ), the ‘real’ and 
the ‘ideal’, ‘ideal ego’, ‘substitute’ (‘the son or the daughter constituted as the 
father’s substitutes’ ), ‘projection’, ‘regression’, ‘murder of the father’ (by social 
mobility)… The theory of the cleavages of the habitus (see other contributions 
in this Special Section) is indeed rooted in this extended use of psychoanalytic 
terms and lines of reasoning. 
 
Likewise, in Pascalian Meditations, the section ‘Libido and illusion’ deals with a 
classical sociological question (the relationships between primary and 
secondary or ‘specialized’ socializations) by stating that the conversion of 
dispositions, when an individual enters a field, has to do with ‘a series of 
imperceptible transactions, semi-conscious compromises and psychological 
operations (projection, identification, transference, sublimation, etc.).’ 
(Bourdieu, 1997: 197). Freud’s analyses about ‘compromise-formation’ and 
‘organization of the libido’ are explicitly referred to, in order to study a domain 
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where Bourdieu could obviously have used sociological concepts — and 
Bourdieusian ones, for a start. Even more strikingly, sociology and 
psychoanalysis are put at the same level:  
The original form of illusio is the investment in the domestic space, the 
place of a complex process of socialization of the sexual and sexualisation 
of the social. Sociology and psychoanalysis should unite their strengths  
(but to do so they would need to overcome their prejudices against each 
other) to analyze the genesis of investment in a field of social relations. 
(Bourdieu, 1997: 198-199) 
 
The symmetry between ‘the sexual and the social’ seems a recurrent way for 
Bourdieu to talk about the relationships between sociology and psychoanalysis, 
a synecdoche even, since it was already the case in the Avant-Propos dialogué : 
The world of mathematics, for an adolescent, is a world of purity, of 
gratuity, which makes it possible to free oneself from the sexual and the 
social ; one should do a kind of social psychoanalysis of the choice of 
hard sciences as a way to distance oneself from existential problems, 
sexuality, but also everything that is linked with the social. (Maître and 
Bourdieu, 1994: XIV) 
 
Going thirty years ahead, the dissymmetry that Le Métier de sociologue was 
striving both to manifest and to establish — with its definition of a sociological 
point of view as specific, or even as transcendent (exterior, and superior) — 
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seems indeed to have given way to symmetry (the sexual and the social, 
sociology and psychoanalysis…) and correspondences (dispositions are 
equivalent to instincts, the field is almost an institution…). 
 
Return of the repressed 
 
But such a history — that of a sociologist progressively freed from his 
prejudices towards psychoanalysis, or rather made free to express his 
intellectual affinities — is not the whole story. And even the texts studied here 
can tell a different story if closely scrutinized. 
 
Let us go back first to ‘The contradictions of the inheritance’, in La Misère du 
Monde. The text ends with two pages, displaying a general overtone much 
different from earlier formulations:  
One should be careful not to see the family as the ultimate cause of the 
distress it seems to cause (…) Behind the story of the most ‘’personal’’ 
difficulties and of apparently strictly subjective tensions and 
contradictions are often expressed the deepest structures of the social 
world and their contradictions. (Bourdieu, 1993: 716) 
 
When Bourdieu explicitly defines the relationships between sociology and 
psychoanalysis, he does so by refusing to see them as alternatives to each other 
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(one could argue that such an ‘alternating’ vision is that of Le Métier de 
Sociologue)v:  
It is necessary to guard against thinking of these relationships as 
alternatives to each other. Sociology does not claim to substitute its mode 
of explanation for that of psychoanalysis. (Bourdieu, 1999: 512) 
 
But Bourdieu does not resort to dichotomous symmetry. He states that 
sociology is concerned ‘… to construct differently certain givens that 
psychoanalysis also takes as its objects, and to do so by focusing on aspects of 
reality that psychoanalysis pushes aside as secondary or insignificant’. The 
specificity of sociology is also to take very seriously and to study for themselves 
realities that psychoanalysis ‘treats as defenses that have to be breached to get 
to the essential element (for example, academic or professional 
disappointments, job conflicts, etc.).’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 512). Moreover, Bourdieu 
does not call here for a unification of the explanations of sociology and 
psychoanalysis and he seems rather skeptical about the possibility of escaping 
‘eclectic rapprochements of pop psychoanalysis and soft sociology’ when trying 
to built a ‘socioanalysis’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 512). 
 
Here, rather than alternative, symmetrical or united disciplines, sociology and 
psychoanalysis appear as complementary ways of looking at - sometimes the 
same - things. And Bourdieu’s point of view is clearly sociological. In his 
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perspective, psychic processes do exist, but what is important for the sociologist 
is to look at what the social order does to them :  
A true sociogenesis of the dispositions that constitute the habitus should 
be concerned with understanding how the social order collects, channels, 
reinforces or counteracts psychological processes depending on whether 
there is a homology, redundancy, and reinforcement between the two 
systems or, to the contrary, contradiction and tension. (Bourdieu, 1999: 
512) 
 
Then, even if ‘it goes without saying that mental structures do not simply reflect 
social structures’, Bourdieu insists on how the field influences wishes, and 
converts them into ‘specific illusio’ and socially approved forms. He thus 
focuses on one aspect of the dialectics between instincts and fields: the 
sociological direction of causality. Bourdieu hammers this point in by 
mentioning Freud’s analysis of the family romance, in which daydreams can 
serve two ends: the ambitious goal and the erotic one, the latter, according to 
Freud, being often hidden behind the former. Bourdieu then adds : ‘It is not up 
to me to confirm or deny Freud’s affirmation. But I would like to recall the 
complementary affirmation that psychoanalysis overlooks : wishes manifest 
themselves within each field only under the specific form that the field assigns 
to them at a given moment in time and which is, more often than not, that of 
ambition.’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 718). The social ‘form’ of ambition is therefore not a 
mere smokescreen, or a mask behind which the erotic would be hidden: the 
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social context – the field - is what makes wishes manifest themselves in a 
particular way and exist at a given moment of time and in a given individual. 
 
A small passage of the ‘Avant-Propos dialogué’ seems to pick up exactly where 
‘The contradictions of inheritance’ stops. It asserts not only an influence of 
fields on wishes and desires, but stresses the very production of wishes by fields:  
Wishes are constituted as they are expressed. [When a field] offers 
possibilities of expression to wishes, it gives them raisons d’être, it 
legitimizes them and therefore creates them (…) If you change the space of 
possibles and legitimate expressions of wishes, you change wishes 
themselves (…). And isn’t this a reproach that could be made to 
psychoanalysis, which often stops looking when the social begins to work 
on wishes, by providing them with opportunity to express themselves, but 
also principles of structuration and raison d’être (…). [Freud] did not have 
a sophisticated enough vision of the social world as a space of possibles - 
as a keyboard with which wishes can play and constitute themselves - to 
have a theory of the socialization of libido. (Maître and Bourdieu, 1994: 
XVI-XVII) 
 
The understanding of sociology as a science which may use the same data and 
objects as psychoanalysis - but is to look at what psychoanalysis overlooks, 
pushes aside as details or smokescreens, or fails to grasp - is therefore much 
closer to the epistemology of Le Métier de Sociologue. The idea that the social 
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‘forms’ given to psychic or psychological processes are indeed part of these 
processes, make them exist in a certain way and not only shape them, is 
similarly a strong sociological standpoint. 
  
Such a standpoint suggests that the Bourdieusian approach vis-à-vis 
psychoanalysis is better understood as a sociologisation of psychoanalysis — an 
‘annexation [of psychoanalysis] through the sociological treatment of certain of 
its concepts’ (Fourny, 2000: 103) — rather than as a complementary or 
integrated approach. To exemplify such a position, I will briefly go back to my 
own research on anorexia and show the way some of its results are in line with 
it.  
 
First, such a sociologisation means that objects are to be chosen and constructed 
within the sociological approach itself, even when they seemingly ‘belong’ to 
another disciplinary realm. For example, my focus on ‘anorexic practices’, on 
what young girls labelled as anorexics actually do, comes from a sociological 
interest both in individual activity and social practices (as situated in social 
space), which can be opposed to the psychological or psychoanalytical tendency 
to overlook such practices as mere symptoms.  
 
Second, the sociological stance detailed above entails explaining, as 
Durkheim’s moto goes, ‘the social by the social’ and therefore looking at the 
chosen objects with our own sociological gaze. This is where I depart strongly 
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from George Steinmetz’s views regarding Bourdieu’s position but also more 
generally about the relationships between sociology and psychoanalysis. For 
George Steinmetz (2006: 453) — who calls upon Vincent de Gaulejac — 
Bourdieu ‘did not recognize that Freudian/Lacanian theory could help him to 
avoid the problem of « sociologism », that is, of reducing the process of the 
« incoporation » of the social into the individual to (…) logics of social power’. 
With the ‘first’ Bourdieu of the Craft of Sociology, but even also, as I have tried to 
show in this article, with the ‘late’ Bourdieu of the 1990’s, I fail to see where the 
problem is for sociologists to be sociologists and to practice ‘sociologism’ — a 
criticism often uttered against Bourdieu by rational choice sociologists. For 
example, anorexic patients are well-known for their ‘non compliance’ to the 
hospital’s requirements and point of view, and for their ‘resistance’ within the 
psychological or psychoanalytical sessions. This resistance is generally 
interpreted as psychological and is linked to mental pathology. Without 
endorsing this view, I tried to look at such resistance as a social will and way of 
acting, made possible by distinctive class resources. I showed that the specific 
ways in which anorexic patients resist medical power is not absent of social 
class dispositions and attitudes, such as self-assurance, a sense of entitlement, 
familiarity and connivance with the medical world, or a relation to ‘speech’ and 
discourse that comes with a high level of cultural capital (Author, 2003, 2009).  
Similarly, instead of trying to answer the question of gender the way it is 
framed by psychology (as a refusal or a denial of femininity, for example), I 
showed that anorexic practices are extreme forms of typical practices of women 
from the middle and upper classes, and that hospital work can be interpreted as 
an enduring work on patients destined to ‘re-feminize’ them, which is oriented 
by and  towards a specific definition of middle-class (and not upper-class) 
femininity (Author, 2003, 2007).  
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More generally, I showed that the anorexic career is both made possible by the 
social properties of the young girls who engage in it and oriented towards the 
upper regions of social space and a specific definition of social excellence 
(Author, 2003, 2009). In Bourdieu’s terms, quoted above, this comes down to 
showing that ‘wishes manifest themselves within each field only under the 
specific form that the field assigns to them’, or that fields ‘constitute’ and 
‘create’ wishes and not only offer them possibilities of expression. In all these 
instances, what we see is the way the social world, as a space of possibles, 
‘socializes libido’, even in its ‘pathological’ forms. To me sociology has much to 
gain from this kind of confrontation with ‘unusual’ objects, as long as, to 
paraphrase Spinoza, it strives to persevere in its disciplinary and 
epistemological being. But such studies can also benefit the general knowledge 
of these objects, as an ‘unusual’ way to look at them, which can possibly bring 
out new elements. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A sociological analysis of Bourdieu’s relationships to psychoanalysis would 
require, most evidently, an analysis of their relative positions within the 
academic field, together with a sociological account of Bourdieu’s trajectory, 
position, dispositions and stances. As much as I acknowledge that this would 
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be most desirable, this paper never had such an intention. Its aim has been to 
address some very particular questions: (1) What could account for the 
discrepancy between the blatant elective affinities between socioanalysis and 
psychoanalysis and the very few explicit discussions of psychoanalysis by 
Bourdieu ? (2) How can we characterize Bourdieu’s few explicit claims about 
the connections between these two fields of academic enquiry over the years ? 
(3) Do they tell a specific history of connection between these two fields, from 
criticism to embracing, refusal to acceptance, repression to transgression ? I 
have tried to show that even if such a repression-to-transgression interpretation 
has been suggested by Bourdieu himself, the fundamentals of his position 
spelled out in Le Métier de Sociologue remained the same. 
 
I, for one, do not regret this consistency. The ‘scientific’ and ‘positivist’ roots of 
French sociology may appear as rigid constraints and a heavy tradition, but 
those roots are what made French sociology what it is, in its specificity and also 
its contribution. It could be argued that the richness of sociology could indeed 
be lost in a ‘socioanalysis’ that would blur the specificity of the sociological eye 
because of a too close proximity with psychoanalysis — at the risk, highlighted 
by Bourdieu, of combining ‘pop psychology’ with soft sociology. This is why 
the epistemological stance outlined in some passages of ‘The contradictions of 
the inheritance’ and in some parts of the ‘Avant-Propos dialogué’ seems more 
desirable. A ‘sociologisation’ of psychoanalysis, which is what Bourdieu sought, 
consists in the acknowledgement of both the specificity and the sovereignty of 
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sociology. When sociology tackles realities that psychoanalysis also considers, it 
should, therefore: (1) choose its own objects: for example, look at aspects of 
realities which psychoanalysis deems unimportant or considers as mere 
defenses, (2) look at them with its own gaze: for example, not look for the 
sexual behind the social but for the social behind the sexual, decipher the social 
structure that lies under family past, and more generally hold that the ‘social’ is 
not a mere form, or language, or smokescreen, but that it is, within a 
sociological approach, the stuff that reality is made of. In contrast to the 
psychoanalysation of sociology that socioanalysis often involves, such a 
sociologisation of psychoanalysis seems beneficial to sociology, but it would 
also ensure a more fruitful, equal and complex pas-de-deux between sociology 
and psychoanalysis. 
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Notes 
1 Paraphrasing Lucretius and his theory of atoms, Bourdieu used this 
expression (‘les atomes crochus de l’habitus’) to talk about the not so 
mysterious and socially constructed affinities between habituses. 
2 Indexes were closely monitored by Bourdieu, and they can be used as 
indications of what he actually wanted to signal as important in his books. 
3 All excerpts from the Avant-Propos dialogué are translated by me. To 
translate technical psychoanalytical terms, I used the Freudian glossary 
provided by http://www.psychanalyse.lu/articles/Glossaire.htm, consulted in 
April 2013. 
4 Jean-François Fourny (2000: 104, 107) already depicts such ‘oscillation’ 
and ‘hesitations’ in Bourdieu’s relation to psychoanalysis, but refers Bourdieu’s 
‘ambiguity’ to a ‘potentially destabilizing conflict’ and an ‘uneasy relationship 
with psychoanalysis’. George Steinmetz describes also vividly these moments 
when Bourdieu ‘takes back with one hand what he has given with the other’, 
but likewise tends to describe them in psychological or even pathological terms, 
for example as a ‘characteristic defensive move’ (2006: 447), as a ‘disavowal’ 
which has an ‘obsessive quality’ (2006: 452), as an ‘allergic relationship’ (to Lacan) 
(2006: 459), as an ‘affliction’(2013 : 128), a ‘problem’, a ’failure’ or an ‘error’, 
‘because so many of Bourdieu’s ideas are based on, or require integration with, 
psychoanalysis (especially the Lacanian version)’ (2006: 448). By using the 
phrase ‘pas-de-deux’ I would like on the contrary to offer a more neutral 
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depiction of the phenomena and even hint at its strategic and very conscious 
dimension — Bourdieu being well-known for his disciplinary reflexivity and 
the constant strategic maneuvers in his texts (quoting and not quoting, 
elevating, ridiculing or ignoring, expliciting alliances and oppositions or 
keeping them implicit…) (Encrevé, Lagrave, 2003). 
5 For a different interpretation of this sentence — Bourdieu failing to see 
that sociology and psychoanalysis ‘were not alternatives, but that 
psychoanalysis filled some of the lacunae in his own theoretical approach’ — 
see (Steinmetz, 2006: 459-460). 
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